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THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: IDEOLOGY AS ITS STRATEGIC CENTER OF GRAVITY
An analysis of the global war on terrorism (GWOT) focuses attention on the evidence that religious ideology is a theme that permeates the methodology, justification, and rhetoric of alQaeda, other global terrorist organizations and their supporters. The National Security Strategy (NSS) for the United States of September 2002 however, states that the war is against politically motivated terrorists of global reach and not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. 1 This means that unlike prior enemies, there is no clear state for the U.S to direct its national powers against, but instead a loose organization of groups. Groups that purportedly have political ends to achieve, but groups that do not use political methods to achieve those ends. They instead resort to terrorism as a method against states, strong and otherwise, that they feel have oppressed and marginalized them. These groups are not using political, military or economic methods, but a continuing flow of recruits to execute terrorism. To attain their goals, political or religious, they must have some unifying source that sustains them. Simple hatred is too diverse and susceptible to diffusion, besides it is a symptom, not a source.
However, history has shown that ideology can be utilized to feed, control and focus hatred.
Without a clear idea of what is the unifying factor(s) for these terrorist groups, their center(s) of gravity or the source(s) of their power, there exists a larger degree of possibility that any national power employment efforts maybe misdirected, marginalized or even counterproductive. If the grand strategy on terrorism is silent on this unifying power issue, it leaves the components to decide for themselves the enemy's centers of gravity on the strategic, operational and tactical level.
The purpose of this paper is fourfold: first, to analyze the issue of centers of gravity to determine if it is possible that ideology can be a center of gravity (COG); second, to determine if ideology is the COG for global terrorists; third, to identify which ideology is that unifying ideology; fourth, to present response strategies against the determined center(s) of gravity.
A REVIEW OF THE CENTER OF GRAVITY CONCEPT
The first task then, in planning for war is to identify the enemy's centers of gravity, and if possible trace them back to a single one.
Clausewitz
Since Karl von Clausewitz formalized the center of gravity (COG) concept in his book On War, military planners have used it as a doctrinal focal point. Clausewitz saw war as "merely the continuation of a (nation's) policy by other means," and "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will." 3 National policymakers must take the concept of COG(s) to heart during grand strategy formulation in determining the critical single source of the enemy's strength. I will argue that operational and tactical COG(s) have been substituted for the strategic COG during the selection and employment of national power elements in the GWOT. This has resulted in less effective national power employment efforts.
A condensed review of the center of gravity concept is useful. Since its introduction by Clausewitz, the COG theory has not been static in either theory or application. For instance, Clausewitz did not distinguish among tactical, operational or strategic COGs, but they exist.
Clausewitz's theory was based on his observations of what were then conventional European conflicts and the focusing of military power on a few key centers. These included the army, the capital city, alliances and the leadership. As the industrial revolution developed, a nation's industrial capability became a potential center of gravity.
Guilio Douhet, a twentieth-century Italian theorist, added elements to the centers of gravity debate. When the psychological component is considered it is clear that no iron clad and rigid process for identifying centers of gravity can be produced. It is possible, however, to derive general rules of thumb and guidelines. 4 Douhet therefore proposed two new centers of gravity, population centers and the enemy's air force. He felt that if one's air force could attack and degrade these two opposition centers severely enough, one would demoralize the enemy and cause a collapse of the enemy.
Douhet's expansion of the population center and its psychological component as a COG is valuable and valid.
Later, Colonel John A. Warden III, USAF wrote, Two different conceptions of centers of gravity exist. One approach identifies centers of gravity solely within the enemy's armed force. The second approach admits that the enemy's armed force is the most tangible center of gravity and the easiest to identify, but that other possible centers of gravity exist which contribute to the ability of this force to pursue the war. 5 Warden recognized that different states or organizations (i.e. military or terrorist networks) have unique COGs specific to them. He acknowledged that:
The COG concept is simple in concept but difficult in execution because of the likelihood that more than one center will exist at anytime and that each center will have an effect of some kind on the others. 6 Warden diverges from Clausewitz in that he allows for multiple centers of gravity at each level.
Later studies, particularly by Dr. Joe Strange argue that Warden's COGs were actually critical capabilities that supported a COG.
COGs can be different from one military campaign to another when separated by time and circumstances. It has been accepted by the U.S. Army that during Desert Storm the Iraqi Republican Guard was the COG for that campaign." 7 The Republican Guard however, was not declared the COG for Operation Iraqi Freedom. An initial analysis of the enemy's operational and tactical centers of gravity requires constant reappraisal during both planning and execution.
It may develop or change during the course of the campaign or war.
Joint Pub 5-00.1, Joint Doctrine for Campaign Planning describes COGs as:
Those aspects of the adversary's overall capability that, theoretically, if attacked and neutralized or destroyed will lead either to the adversary's inevitable defeat or force opponents to abandon aims or change behavior.
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This definition can be applied to strategic, operational, and tactical COGs. Success against one level COG should have a direct impact on another level in a cascading effect. If the effect is non-existent, the target was incorrectly labeled as a COG. It is then acceptable to state that success against the strategic COG will end the war.
Antulio Echevarria differs in the approach to COGs than that of the Joint Pub 5-00.1, in that the Joint Publication is too capabilities based, whereas he believes Clausewitz's theory is effects based. 9 The effects based approach has important and direct effect on the strategy for the GWOT. The selection of a center of gravity focuses clarity of purpose and empowers decisive thinking. Current military doctrine is clear on the failure to successfully identify and define the enemy's COG -your efforts to defeat your enemy will fail.
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COGs are not enemy weakness, vulnerabilities, or capabilities, but are in a way what Echevarria refers to as focal points where certain forces come together. 11 The convergence of focal points creates a structure, physical or not, that gives connectivity and unity to the enemy.
Echevarria asserts that this structure is not a COG, the source of strength, but only a sense of balance. He states "a blow to the enemy's COG would throw him off balance or put differently, cause his entire system (or structure) to collapse." 12 The terrorist network is such a structure, which is given shape and balance by a COG that needs to be identified and attacked.
ANALYSIS OF IDEOLOGY AS A CENTER OF GRAVITY
Ideology is a systematic body of concepts especially about human life and culture.
13
There is reason to believe that Clausewitz would accept ideology as a COG, as an assessment of COGs will at some point lead to the "remarkable trinity of war" articulated by Clausewitz. The three elements of the trinity that he describes are: primordial violence, hatred and enmity; the play of chance, friction, and probability; and an instrument of policy which is subject to reason alone. Clausewitz then connects each with sets of human sectors: the people with hatred and enmity; the army with friction, chance, and probability; and the government for whom policy should be driven by reason, hence "war is an instrument of policy." The will of the people is paramount, followed by the political leadership and lastly military capability. 14 History has repeatedly shown that the will of the people is subject to psychological influence, and can be manipulated to use its primordial violence and hatred for the cause of the state or its ideology.
Wars on political ideologies have normally required a state to counter, examples being fascism with Germany and Italy, or countering the spread of communism by containing and countering the actions and efforts of the Soviet Union, and its satellite states. As the full range of U.S. national power could be applied against those states, it therefore was applied against fascism or communism. Communism, as originally defined by Marxian socialism, was utilized to mobilize the proletariat class against the privileged class. Utilized by Lenin and Stalin it was a totalitarian tool of a new privileged class of government officials, and focused against those for whom communism was intended to aid, the working class. Ideologies create a new privileged class.
Fascism started as a mass movement to mobilized Italians and Germans against the hardships after World War I through a mixture of socialism and nationalism. After German fascism had molded itself with racist hatred into Nazism, core militant and radical groups became willing to use violence focused against opposition groups sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions.
These ideologies seed and feed the frustration and despair of the poor and working classes to develop and focus hatred against others, those that were not like them, (Jews and capitalists), and who, they were told were the true basis for their misery. The international community unwittingly allowed the fascists to grow strong, to develop a leadership structure and to raise an army.
It was the army and leadership that the West fought directly in World War II because of the strength that they have developed. Nevertheless, the fascist ideology nurtured the core believers and fed the disenfranchised. Ideology was the source of strength, but once institutionalized it had to be attacked through critical capabilities, the German and Italian armies.
However, the hatred ideology needed to be eliminated for lasting victory.
IDEOLOGY -THE CENTER OF GRAVITY FOR TERRORISM
The hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends. That is the point against which all our energies should be directed. There are two definitions that deserve attention. The Department of Defense has the most comprehensive definition of terrorism and of particular note is the inclusion of religion and ideology in the nature of the terrorist goals:
The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.
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The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), a cornerstone document, defines terrorism as: premeditated, politically motivated, violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents.
20
There are three major flaws with the later definition. First is that statements from alQaeda, the Taliban leader Mullah Omar Mohammad, and most radical Islamist clerics is that armed action against the U.S. and it's allies is a religious (not political) requirement for all Muslims as the actions are part of a defensive armed jihad (struggle) to defend the Muslim umma (community). The second problem is that the adversary of the U. The strong effects of the Gulf War on the radical Islamist movement may have been underestimated. To many in the radical Islamist movement the United States was the only power able to undermine Salafi Islam. The Soviet Union had collapsed, as they saw it by jihad, so its support of an Arab socialism threat to the Islamist movement was non-existent. However, the U.S. posed a threat, and it was massing troops in the "Holy Land" for war. Even though the Saudi government had obtained permission from the Ulama (highest religious council) to invite the non-Muslim troops, and despite the fact that the great majority left after the war, the mere presence of the troops created continuing problems. The Western presence, apparently emboldened modern Saudis to act and there were modernist protests for political reforms.
These actions created a backlash by strict Wahhabi clerics who looked for a way to expel the Western Christian soldiers. 32 The result was a religious establishment that was more vocal and To see what motivates terrorists, Harold Vetter suggests that classifying terrorists is an important first step. There are various typologies; one yet simple typology breaks terrorists into crusaders, criminals, and crazies. The first, crusaders, covers the al-Qaedas of the worldattempting to achieve goals through violent means. They commit terror to persuade their potential followers that their ideological cause is not hopeless, that armed jihad can destroy There is yet another type, the pragmatic terrorist who has a political agenda, an objective end to ascend to power. They are in competition with other groups for ruling power over a particular area. The pragmatic uses terrorism because as they see it they have been denied access to other tools of power, political, economic or informational. As they are not the ruling power, they do not have military power so they must either create an army as done in Colombia 36 or use what they consider asymmetrical military power -terrorist acts. The truth is that they have been frustrated in their use of political and informational power by their native countries. These countries were authoritarian in nature, lacked pluralism, freedom of speech and press and hope. Authoritarian works against pluralism, it frames different views as opposing views that must be silenced.
The problem with radical Islamist thoughts and practices is that it is as totalitarian as the state regime it seeks to replace. It seeks to create an order wherein its proponents are the sole spokesmen of a vengeful and chauvinistic God. The radical Islamists looked for a reason for their failure beyond themselves, and often beyond the host government of the country for the "true source" of their oppressions. They saw it as modernization and its chief proponent the United States, another superpower to be defeated and armed jihad was again the method. This section will cover how radical militant Islam became the unifying ideology for terrorism by a review of the history of radical militant Islam and the role that education plays in the fostering of terrorism through hatred ideology.
RADICAL MILITANT ISLAM -THE UNIFYING IDEOLOGY FOR TERRORISM

HISTORY OF HATRED AND VIOLENCE
The current move towards modern Islamist action, (the politicalization of Islam), was fostered in the Middle East and was the result of the global trend towards modernization and the large changes that modernization brings. Authoritarian governments could not manage or contain these changes and had failed to prepare their people for change. The result was a lack of freedoms, lack of plurality with the resultant feelings by the people of despair, and the lack of hope. The West had supported many of these regimes during the Cold War for strategic reasons. When the Cold War ended, it was difficult to convince many authoritarian regimes to change, to embrace democracy and globalization. Those that did so did to a small extent and mostly in the global free trade area. How did much of the Muslim Arab world get to this point?
The two major players in Arab development and the development of modern militant radical
Islamists are Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Their histories are intertwined. The mosque and its school remained a relatively independent institution in many Arab states, and therefore became an important center for expressing discontent, especially for the unemployed and disenfranchised youth. This situation is a breeding ground for the radical militant Salafi ideology to take root. 55 The recruitment progress for Islamist terrorist groups focuses on this indoctrination ingredient. The impact of this religious hatred education will be long term, difficult to reverse, which means that corrective action must be comprehensive and credible. Credibility is something that the U.S. must earn through its words and actions. To defeat terrorism means containment and marginalization of the totalitarian ideology nurturing and unifying it.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Realizing the limited expanse of this paper, recommendations are offered without full expansion.
There are things that the U.S. must do in the War on Terrorism to neutralize radical militant Islamist ideology:
1. Ensure that our efforts in the GWOT do not diminish our strengths. such an enemy cannot be eradicated through military operations and law enforcement dragnets alone, since there are always others to take the place of the fallen. The violent true believer can only be stopped if the ideas that nurture violence and terrorism are discredited. Convince these who would join the terrorists that the ideas of violence are not the ideas of Islam, and the flow of future recruits may slow to a manageable trickle.
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Effective law enforcement and intelligence operations can only occur with the aid of international law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Diplomacy is the conduit. It must be accepted that effective diplomacy occurs when backed by credible military and economic power, not the other way around. Effective U.S. policy in addressing the cause of terrorism, must address through informational education the failed policies that fostered the seeds of hopelessness that freed the Islamist terrorists. We must strongly support both moderate and progressive Muslims.
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The interdependence of national powers should be obvious and they must be focused on the objective of the grand strategy. Strategically, the effective neutralization of the radical militant Islamic ideology. Operationally, the disruption and destruction of terrorist networks with global reach and the termination of state support for terrorist.
76
The war against Islamist terrorists is a war against an ideology and its advocates, as difficult and dangerous a threat to our national security as were fascism and communism. It will take the same commitment and a similar approach of containment of ideology as we wear down its advocates to the point where their ideology support collapses under its own false legs. The effort requires more economic, diplomatic and intelligence/law enforcement cooperative effort then projected military power.
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war on terror, we must also win the war of ideas -the battle for the minds of those who are being recruited by terrorist networks across the globe. It is critical that our country recognize that the war on terrorism will be long, difficult and dangerous -and that as we deal with immediate terrorist threats, we also need to find ways to stop the next generation of terrorists from forming. (March 2001), 3-11 . Additionally, the denying of sanctuaries to terrorists, is something that must be addressed but with the reality that it will be difficult and a long-term problem. An example is the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in western Pakistan. The tribes in the FATA who have traditionally been permitted to rule themselves by tribal laws have varying agendas and loyalties, which complicate the situation. The U.S. must realize the complexity of the issue for Pakistan and support Pakistan in a reasonable and firm manner dictated by actions on the ground and not domestic U.S. policy. 27 Washington Post Staff. "General Warns of Pakistani, Saudi Extremists" Washington Post, 30 January 2004. p 15. In addition to military power, the U.S. has spent considerable effort to disrupt the financing and training camps of radical Islamic terrorists, but it has done little to address the power that radical Islamic terrorists used most effectively, communication. The NSCT acknowledges the communication skills bin Laden and al-Qaeda has effectively utilized to advance their cause. Where is the U.S. expertise or strategic way to counter this effort? Besides a condemnation of bin Laden's call for Muslims to do their "religious duty" and acquire WMD, where was the concerted effort by the U.S. to address how this call was contrary to the teaching of the Qur'an and other aspects of Islamic law. Condemnation alone by the U.S. is a weak one-dimension message. However, there is a danger in linking the image of the "New Warrior Class" as described by Ralph Peters, and the hard-core jihadists. The former are persons of opportunity who by banding together in an armed manner, under some banner (religious or otherwise) have the illusion of temporary power. As the poor conditions under which they live change their ranks will diminish rather quickly. The jihadists (armed radical militant) however, will not be deterred or placated by improving economic conditions. Theirs is a religious calling, motivated by ideology. 36 The Colombian terrorist groups, the FARC and the ELN, started as Marxist insurgents in the 1960s, who over the years have turned into narco-terrorists. Their ideology gave way to the greed fostered by their involvement in the drug trade, which started to fund their insurgency. However, unlike al-Qaeda, they never sought separation from large segments of the population, as their goals were pluralist and political in nature. The ideas in this paragraph are based on remarks made by speakers participating in a USAWC Regional Strategic Assessment series. 37 Gold, [89] [90] [91] [92] [93] [94] [95] [96] [97] [98] [99] [100] [101] [102] [103] 172, 186 . He discusses at length the Middle East problems of dealing with modernity and the transformation of their societies under corrupt and repressive regimes, which had not been solved by past attempts at Arab Nationalism or Socialism. Western democratic political approaches and economic reform have failed due to the expectation of both sides for quick results. This led to economic upheaval for which the regimes blamed Western Imperialism. Militant radical Islamists offer themselves up as the only force capable to do something about Western Imperialism. They utilize an interpretation of the Islamic teaching to state that Christianity and Judaism, the basis of Western Civilization, are flawed and only the pure approach to Islam can save the Muslim masses. Also of note is that as the authoritarian works against pluralism, the same approach is taken by radical Islamists, "submission to my . However, a fault in their argument is that contrary to the authors' views, the idea that there is a monolithic transnational entity, religious or political, called the civilization of Islam is simply contrary to the facts. While there are two main branches of Islam, Sunni (85% of the 1 billion Muslims) and Shi'i (mostly in Iran), there are 70 major communities that have broken away. Only 15% of Muslims live in the Middle East, China has 50 million Muslims and 45% live in South Asia. Like other religions, Islam has been subject to growth, development, adaptation and change. Most importantly, the current radical Islamic approach is a throwback to the 7th and 9th centuries and is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims. 39 The Roman Catholic Church used Inquisitions (first in 1231 by Pope Gregory IX and the second in 1478 authorized by Pope Sixtus IV for King Ferdinard V and Queen Isabella -hence the name Spanish Inquisition), focused against those proposing an alternate path to salvation. There are similarities between the views of Pope Gregory and strict Islamist clerics in that he believed that non-believers must be given an opportunity to see the error of their ways, repent and return to the true path before punishment. Hence the trial or inquisition. Second, that the non-believer threatens the social order, the privileged place that the religious authorities held, and their relationship with the power of the State. Fundamentalism was normally applied to those Christians who took the Bible as a literal scripture. Islamic Muslims have always done so with the Qur'an. Therefore, to describe a terrorist act as having been committed by Islamic fundamentalists insults and incorrectly mislabels many Muslims. It is also a counter-productive message when used by the U.S. Government or U.S. media, as the message will be lost due to insult and anger. U.S. policy must articulate the ways in which we deal with the clear difference between a militant or radical Islamist and a terrorist using the guise of Islam and Islamic Law. Islamic Law is based on four sources, the most important being the Qur'an, the writing and deeds of Muhammad (hadiths), the consensus of the community (ijima) and analogical reasoning (qiyas). 41 Jihad means struggle or exertion and applies to physical or moral struggle and could mean the effort to control one's temper or to quit smoking. It is a highly nuanced concept that in no way denotes the term use of "Holy War." Qur'an (2:217) permits physical action to fight aggression or to support the struggle for justice, but outlines strict guidelines for use of violence. Al-Qaeda has violated many of these guidelines, such as attacking innocent persons.
Note -the central part of Arabia known as the Najd was ruled by tribal families like Al-Saud. 43 According to Islamic tradition, a warrior who gives his life in a true jihad, translated into meaning holy war, becomes a martyr (shahid), who is guaranteed entry into paradise. This was particularly true during the 7th century. However, an important process occurred during the 9th century, Muslim scholars broadened the meaning of jihad (literally-struggle) to emphasize a personal internal struggle. Therefore, for tens of millions of Muslims, jihad is a personal struggle of self-improvement. Additionally, the Islamic Sufism tradition added a mystic aspect to jihad and Islam. Mainstream Islam moved away from the militant interpretation of jihad, to the point that someone who effectively spread the word of God and his messenger (Muhammad) could be considered a shahid. 44 Gold, 22 -34. Note, the second House of Saud under Faisal recovered some influence in the mid 19th century, but it collapsed upon his death in 1865. 45 47 Gold, 94. Gold discusses that Azzam and al-Zawahiri broke with the founding nature of the Muslim Brotherhood, by using armed jihad under the guise of Islam for personal purposes. The Brotherhood, which started in the 1920s with welfare activities by promoting a revitalization of Islam and had grown over five decades into a political struggle against Colonialism. 48 Ibid, 96. 49 It is important to note and publish that many people killed or injured in terrorist attacks are Muslims. The November 3, 2003 bombing in Istanbul, Turkey killed twenty, most of them Muslims. Attacks in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and at the embassies in Africa also killed many Muslims. 50 Gold, 7,25. Gold discusses that most of the Muslim community accepts five pillars of Islam: accepting oneness of God and spreading the word of God and his messenger, prayer; charity or Zakat, Ramadan fast, the pilgrimage to Mecca. However, there remained a small element within the Muslim community that continued with the concept of the militant jihad. The Kharajtes left the Islamic mainstream in the 7th century and elevated jihad to a sixth pillar of Islam. Their influence remained limited until the 18th century, when the Wahhabi movement restored the armed militant nature to jihad. Sheikh al-Shunibi, Sheikh Jibrin and Sheikh Hamzeh al-Ghazani spoke that the use of the word terrorism by Western government is actually the terror they feel as cowards and is applied in accordance with the law of Allah as jihad is the sixth pillar of Islam.
51 [215] [216] [217] [218] 227 , in which he discusses that the government of Saudi Arabia has made some efforts to control the terrorist groups that operate from and which are financed by organizations within Saudi Arabia. However, the history of Saudi Arabia and the ideology of Wahhabism as being interwoven is a fact. Institutional support for radical Islam has been so pervasive and sustained within Saudi Arabia for at least the last fifty years that the ability of those in the Saudi regime to influence a moderate approach is currently limited. According to Islamic tradition, a warrior who gives his life in a true jihad, translated into meaning holy war, becomes a martyr (shahid), who is guaranteed entry into paradise. This was particularly true during the 7th century.
Note -A fundamental question is how do the US and moderate Muslim countries counter radical militant Islamic preaching. Militant clerics such as Syrian Imam Mahmoud Quul Aghassi, (Abu Qaqaa), or Iraqi Sheik Laith Khalil, are often gifted speakers. They speak of the salvation of heaven through a jihad death. As they cannot offer hope in this world, Khalil assured the jihad martyrs that they are guaranteed a place in heaven and therefore do not need the prayers of others. Aghassi stated that," Muslims should look to martyrdom as a thirsty man looks to water, we want manhood and heroism. We want people to love death and yearn for heaven." It must be highlighted and published that the senior clerics are not the ones embracing a martyr's death. Do they not wish immediate entrance into paradise? 54 There are numerous interpretations of the Qur'an, the document meant to guide the actions of a Muslim. It does address explicitly the law as it relates to personal relationships, manifesting itself in family law. In most other branches of law, western-inspired legal codes have replaced Islamic Law, most notably in Kuwait, Egypt, Jordan, and even Iran. Note -Pakistan has taken steps to counter the growing radical Islamic forces inside their country. The Musarif government outlawed several groups and arrested some leaders, confiscated radical literature and seized bank accounts of the outlawed groups. While these were mostly minor players it was a start. 62 Some of the strengths of the American democracy are our nation's openness and the freedoms that we afford our citizens. The global terrorist attempts to turn our strengths into vulnerabilities by easily entering and remaining undetected in our country. If apprehended, they use all the rights and privileges that our legal system affords. We must guard and balance against losing our rights in pursuit of security. Achieving this balance presents a challenge for our law enforcement and legal communities, the fact that we afford the suspected terrorist these rights is a strength that we should use in the informational effort in the GWOT. This is using our strength against their weakness 63 John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, " Weapons of Mass Deception," Salon.com, 23 September 2003, 1. Stauber commented that propaganda is sometimes successful at deceiving people, but often times it is much less successful at influencing its target population than it is at helping the propaganda team deceive themselves.
There have been several articles written about the concern that the United States is currently suffering loss of credibility and influence with governments and people around the world. This includes the perception that the U.S. is an ally of convenience. While the policy issue at hand is the war on terrorism, not action against Iraq, U.S. actions have linked the two, to the determent of the GWOT. Many claims about Iraq's weapons programs are not being imprinted negatively on the section of the Muslim world that could become an ally. This maybe because we misperceived our ability to diplomatically influence the skeptical, or perhaps because we believed our own rhetoric. David Hoffman, "Islam," Foreign Affairs , 81 (March/April 2002): 83-95 , writes that intervention in a country that is failing or that has failed must entail attention to the factors that led to the failed status. It must have a long-term view, not an in-out approach, as the residents/ citizens of that state have expectations. For this and many other reasons, military action must be the very last option, for it is a blunt tool. Military action is not designed to "win the hearts and minds" of the people of the failed state, but it is designed to defeat opposing military force. The claim of Iraq having reconstituted a nuclear weapons program and could have a nuclear bomb within a year or that Iraq had a centrally controlled chemical weapons program ready to strike have not been supported to date by intelligence or inspection. The message that there is solid proof that Iraq continued to hide development programs both in missile technology and biological agents, and that Iraq consistently violated numerous UN resolutions is lost.
Additionally, the message of pre-emption is that because it is difficult to mount an effective defense against WMD until actual use, a pre-emptive attack against the user of WMD is merely the preservation of a state's right to self-defense. The problem as correctly stated by Anthony Arend and others, is where to draw the line? How does one conclusively prove the criteria of necessity and the proportionality if no attack happened? Israel use of pre-emption in its 1981 attack of the Iraqi Osirak reactor was condemned by international opinion and much of the same world views U.S. action in Iraq the same. This complicates our message to Islamic moderates. There was a reason why the great majority of Muslim countries condemned the September 11th attacks against the U.S. The Hadiths clearly prohibit the killing of civilians and non-combatants in the course of warfare. The Qur'an states that the taking of one's life unjustly is like taking the life of all humanity and adds in 2:190, "Fight for the sake of God those that fight against you, but do not attack them first. God does not love the aggressor." The idea of pre-emption is contrary to Islamic teachings. 64 Ralph A. Hallenbeck, Military as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon-August 1982 -February 1984 (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1991 , 138. 65 The three countries that are major exporters of militant Islamic activity are Saudi Arabia, Iran and Pakistan. All are autocracies in nature. Each has allowed some measure of democratic freedoms with Pakistan the furthest in the lead. However, liberalized autocracies are not good at economic development and are not receptive to full development of democratic institutions. Quick movement to either economic or democratic development is often destabilizing to the regime. Therefore, a wise approach is a policy of incremental change, not the apparent current policy of applying shocks such as the Iraq War to the region in hopes that a positive war and Iraq nation building would force the autocrats to move forward.
However, regarding radical militant Islam, the incremental approach has its risks. The Islamists have large organizations in the form of mosques, universities and other schools. It is this power base that must be moved to a more moderate position. Currently it is a base from which too many militant Islamists sow seeds of hate, intolerance and violence against all those who do not believe what they believe. They also often act as a wedge between groups seeking a broader pluralism and empowerment approach within their state, and the autocratic regime. It is not surprising that the regime moves towards the more powerful of the two groups -the militant Islamist.
There is hope for the incremental approach. In a January 25, 2004 interview, Adnan Pachachi the president of the Iraqi Governing Council spoke of the understanding between his Council and the most powerful religious figure in Iraq, Shiite Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani. It was that while Islam is the official religion of the state (a fact repeated throughout the Muslim world) the Quran and Shaira are but one source of law and legislation. Moderate Islamic scholars have for centuries agreed that a state ruler, be it an individual or governing body, had the authority to pass laws. The challenge is in the balance and the US must accept that this balance will never equal the level of individual freedoms that we experience. But those societies would embrace pluralism, freedom of religion, equal rights and rule of law.
Regarding the religious schools, due to their role in indoctrinating and recruiting radical and militant Islamists, a portion of which become terrorists, the US must take action. Cutting the funding is one method, however well funded religious schools will be resistant to U.S. economic power. Pakistan's madrassahs are currently run by private organizations with generous funds from Saudi Arabia. Saudi funding to radical groups must be curtailed.
That said, President Musharraf had continued to test the water of cooperation with the International Community and does so at his own risk. The US must push strongly in the U.N. (as strongly as it did for the war on Iraq) for the International community to support Musharraf's efforts. Economic aid for health and education programs must exist to replace any "education" funding that Saudi Arabia is now providing Pakistan for the spreading of Wahhahism. exact players that the U.S. must address through its informational power in any War of Ideas. Any state publicly aligned with the U.S. will be marginalized due to the "puppet of the U.S." syndrome. U.S. policy must be to support moderate voices in the Muslim community that are constructively struggling in their own way to create modern democracies with a just and constant rule of law that may, or may not mirror the U.S. 67 While the U.S. must clearly take actions to prevent additional terrorist attacks by alQaeda and associated operatives, the current strategy of focusing on terrorist leadership elimination, a tactical and perhaps operational COG, has meant limited senior U.S. leadership focus on the strategic COG. Individual leaders are important to the setting development and up stage of terrorist groups. However, as shown, some groups like al-Qaeda operate in small groups while the central leadership acts as a clear house. The central leadership elimination is important for planning and coordination disruption, but their removal does not mean the end of the organization, and certainly not the end of the terrorist operations.
Militant terrorists can be broken down into two main groups, the apocalyptic (jihadist) and the pragmatic, and for both of them terrorism is a tool to an end. The pragmatic, which is also the larger group, however can be degraded in effect by the use of U.S. diplomatic, economic, information and military power. They operate on a cost-benefit approach and we must make the cost too high for them. However, the apocalyptic terrorist believes that they are the hand of God, and therefore are willing to die for their beliefs as their hope for the future is not in this world, but in the afterlife.
Additionally, negotiation provides an additional avenue to assess the ends of your enemy, which may give you insight to their ways and means. It does not mean capitulation to their demands. The official U.S. Government position is that it will never negotiate, or even deal with terrorists. This is an idealistic approach that in fact does not reflect reality as the first problem is defining who is a terrorist. The adage of "one person's terrorist is another's freedom fighter" is as true today as it was when the US was dealing with Zionist freedom fighters almost 60 years ago. The challenge for the US is to assist in the empowerment of the moderates without destroying their credibility of independence. Also, the level of secularism that we demand in the U.S. may not be the best path in some Muslim countries.
Ahmad Moussalli, Moderate and Radical Islamic Fundamentalism; The Quest for Modernity, Legitimacy, and the Islamic State (Florida: University Press of Florida, 1999) . Islamic thinkers like Ahmad Moussalli believe that a more enlightened but still fundamentalist approach to re-examining Islam can prove fruitful for those seeking to balance modern life, and the classic teachings of the Qur'an. He argues that the Quranic doctrines of Shura (consultation) and Ijma (consensus) demand informed political participation. The reality however is that most of the Muslims that live in failing states do not have the education to navigate their way through the complexity of Islam The Muslim population is exactly like any other population in that it is full of contradictions. While many Muslims dislike some U.S. actions, they thirst for many ideas and products that represent Western life, freedom of choice in speech, education, and consumer goods. The US should through surrogates influence the madrassas to teach the moderate, tolerant and positive interpretation of the Qur'an identified above.
Additionally, the U.S. can by using its informational power, demonstrate that the Muslim masses that were subjected to militant Islam often rejected it. Efforts to establish an "Islamic State" have in large been a failure. A large portion of Afghanistan people supported the overthrow of the Taliban; in the Sudan hard-line Islamist Hassan-al-Turabi was deposed, and it is now turning towards the West; in Egypt and Algeria (Islamic Salvation Front) extreme Islamic approaches never gained support of the middle class and failed. Attempts to use Islam in the Bosnian War failed to garner mass support throughout the world and Pakistan remains firmly secular despite great efforts by extreme Islamic proponents. U.S. money must be applied to moderate teachers of Islam. The U.S. through diplomatic and economic methods should pursue a mixed approach towards these schools. Those schools that the host country is willing to shut down, we should support that action. We can support a moderate state in its efforts to fund schools that have a mixture of religious, technical and secular studies. Egypt and Jordan have had successes in this approach. The US has a national security interest in neutralizing the activities of militant Islamic madrassahs in Pakistan, but also the Middle East, the South East, and here in the U.S. U.S. funding through the growing American Muslim community and moderate programs in Turkey and particularly India would counter the Wahhabi influence. 69 A September 2003 poll by the Washington Post found that 69% of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein was involved in the September 11, 2001 attacks, and that 50% of Americans thought some of the September 11 hijackers were Iraqis. This is despite the President finally stating also in September 2003 that, neither the FBI, or the CIA have any evidence that Hussein or his regime were involved.
It was noted that Bush administration officials talked about Hussein and bin Laden in the same light, interchangeable and often in the same sentence, this despite the fact that most of the world saw little connection between the two men. Also Vice President Chaney stated in a September 14, 2003 interview on "Meet the Press" that Iraq was "the geographic base of the terrorists who had us under assault now for years, but most especially on September 11, 2001.
term. The military has shown that it can operate a very successful Psyops program as evidenced by the "go home/stay at home campaign" during the war in Iraq. However, the war with Iraq has also complicated the effort to combat terrorism, and greatly shapes the US informational campaign against terrorism. The complexity covers the reasons for going to war at that time and the effects of a US occupation in Iraq will have a militant Islamic recruitment. 71 Washington Post Staff, "Confusion Marks Prisoner Release Outside Baghdad," Washington Post, 9 January 2004, p. 12. The article covers at length how the January 2004 release of prisoners in Baghdad is an example of how not to execute a pro-American information campaign. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) announced a major prisoner release program for Iraqis who "had made a mistake" by supporting the Hussein regime but who did not have "blood stained bands." The released number of prisoners would be approximately 500 of the 9000 held. The first 100 released on that Thursday of those to be released was forthcoming relatives of thousands of prisoners arrived at the prison to see if their relative was being released. The result of course is that the hundreds or the thousands that waited at the prison would be disappointed. As the crowd waited, a military convoy with an open truck full of prisoners with hoods over their heads passed through the crowd. Hoods for operational security is fine, but an open truck and the timing are examples of lack of public relations concepts, which act to counter all the other excellent work being done.
Relatives told of a man known by the entire village of having a shop, which sold balloons to children. He and his sons were arrested for bomb making when US troops found helium in his shop. No one from the US government or the CPA has come to ask about the man's, his son's activities or about the man's shop and its history since their arrest weeks prior. The relatives ask where was this man's "mistake" in supporting Hussein. The CPA must acknowledge when mistakes were also made by coalition forces in order to show their own humanity. Additionally, only 66 prisoners were released that day and that was done approximately one mile down the road from the prison. Probably and rightly, for crowd control purposes, but a better-executed release could have forestalled such a process.
72 Fouad Ajami, "What the Muslim World is Watching," The New York Times Magazine, 8 November 2001, 48-54 , stated that the expansion of media access, specifically independent native outlets will spur competition. That competition thrives on seeking out views that contradict or contrast their competitors, often especially if the dominant outlet may be government controlled or a dominant force in the area like Al Jazeera. The U.S. can help ensure that the necessary expertise and equipment are afforded these new outlets to aid in their survival. The U.S. Government should however not sponsor any station until the others are functioning as any U.S. sponsored station will be viewed as mere propaganda. Once the other stations are online however, the dissemination of U.S. prospective is valuable. The media realize that information coming from the White House Communications Office is biased to the President's views, but still actively seeks such information in an attempt to "read between the lines." But the White House gets to influence the agenda. As Fouad Ajami stated, "No matter how hard we try, we cannot beat Al Jazeera at its own game." So let us change the game or at least the ground rules. 73 Kepel, [136] [137] [138] [139] [140] [141] [142] [143] [144] [145] [146] [147] [148] [149] [150] [363] [364] [365] [366] 74 Quintan Wiktorowicz, Global Jihad (Falls Church, VA: Sound Room Publishers 2002), 5. 75 Progressive Muslim is defined as a Muslim that accepts the themes of social justice, gender justice, and pluralism. At the center of their belief is that Islam holds that every life, Muslim and non-Muslim, has the same intrinsic worth. Additionally a progressive Muslim engages the serious tradition of Islamic thought and practice. Only through this engagement of Islamic thought can one declare that existing interpretations are lacking. This process of engagement places the progressive Muslim apart from a Muslim that is secular in nature due to their secular education or experiences. 76 This does not diminish the clear need to address the myriad of long and short term issues of terrorism in a non-linear manner, but it does suggest that if one does not identify correctly the center of gravity of one's opponent, the efforts expanded will be less effective and possible irrelevant.
GLOSSARY
My effort to organize the wide differences in terms that were encountered during my research.
Defensive jihad -discussed in the Qur'an and permitted for the defensive of Muslims in need. The Qur'an outlines extensive and strict rules for military action in a jihad. Protection to innocents is prominent.
Hadiths -the narration about the life of the Prophet Muhammad.
Islamist movement -the politicalization of Islam requiring that political actors not only consult with religious authorities, but that religious authorities should be the final approval.
Islamic Muslim.
-a Muslim whose daily life and activities are ruled by the Qur'an and the Sunnah (the way of the Prophet Muhammad 
